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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate race
discrimination.1 The statute's prohibition on sex discrimination was added
as an "eleventh-hour amendment in an effort to kill the bill."'2 The effort
failed, and the bill quickly passed as amended, leaving little legislative
history to aid the judicial system's interpretation of the Act.3 Thus, courts
have had to develop their own rationales to interpret the statute, leading to
disparate outcomes among the respective circuits and slow progress as the
Supreme Court creates new precedent one factual scenario at a time.4
This Note discusses the interpretation of the opposition clause within
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 in the context of Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee.6 In
general, the opposition clause protects an employee from retaliation by his
employer if he opposes his employer's illegal conduct. 7 Part II summarizes
the facts and the holding of Crawford. Part III describes Title VII
discrimination in general and antiretaliation in particular. Part IV discusses
the United States Supreme Court's rationale in Crawford, and Part V
questions the interpretation of the opposition clause. Finally, Part VI agrees
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Loyola University New Orleans, College of Law; B.S.M., 2008, Tulane
University, A.B. Freeman School of Business.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
2. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 n.1 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
3. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
4. See id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
6. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
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with the result in Crawford, but disagrees with the extension of the
opposition clause.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2002, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee ("Metro") initiated an internal investigation in response
to rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District's employee
relations director, Gene Hughes.8 Human resources questioned Vicky
Crawford, a Metro employee, about whether she had witnessed
"inappropriate behavior" by Hughes. 9 Crawford described several instances
of questionable behavior.10 Metro took no action against Hughes, but fired
Crawford and two other interviewees after concluding its investigation.11
Crawford filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee and filed a Title VII violation charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that Metro
retaliated against her for her accounts of Hughes' behavior. 12
The District Court granted Metro's motion for summary judgment,
holding that since Crawford had not initiated the complaint against Hughes,
she did not satisfy the opposition clause.13 Furthermore, the District Court
held that Crawford had "merely answered questions by investigators in an
already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone else. ' 14 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed for the same reasons.1 5 Specifically, the Sixth
Circuit held that the opposition clause "demands active, consistent,
'opposing' activities to warrant... protection against retaliation," 16 whereas
Crawford did "not claim to have instigated or initiated any complaint prior
to her participation in the investigation, nor did she take any further action
8. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
9. Id.
10. Id. (describing how Hughes responded to "'Hey Dr. Hughes, what's up?,' by grabbing his crotch
and saying '[Y]ou know what's up'; he had repeatedly 'put his crotch up to [her] window'; and on one
occasion he had entered her office and 'grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch."').
11. Id. Metro claimed the reason for Crawford's dismissal was for embezzlement. Id.
12. Id. at 849-50.
13. Id. at 850.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed. App'x 373, 376 (6th
Cir. 2006), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP., 107 Fed.
App'x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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following the investigation and prior to her firing." 17 Crawford appealed. 18
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the case and, on January 26,
2009, held that the antiretaliation provision of Title VII protects an
employee who communicates discrimination by answering questions during
an employer's internal investigation. 19  The Court found that the
antiretaliation provision does not require an employee's opposition to be
active and purposive.20
III. BACKGROUND
The antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
contains two clauses that state:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants... [1] because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.21
Provision one is known as the "opposition clause," and provision two is
known as the "participation clause. '22 Not only is there little legislative
history regarding the prohibition of sex discrimination because of the hasty
amendment, but the statute also fails to define many terms, such as
"oppose" and "investigation. '23
Thus, the courts have had little guidance from Congress as to the extent
to which the statute applies, as well as the meaning of the antiretaliation
provision.24 Accordingly, this section examines the development of the
current incentive scheme for employers to prevent discrimination. This
section begins by reviewing the decision in Rogers v. EEOC, the first case
to recognize a cause of action based upon a racially discriminatory work
17. Id.
18. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
19. Id. at 849, 851-52.
20. Id. at 849.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
22. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 848.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). This Note only discusses the definition of "oppose" and not
"investigation."
24. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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environment.2 5 It then discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, which extended the Roger's holding to include
sexual harassment under a hostile work environment and held that
principles of agency theory would determine whether or not an employer
was liable for a discriminatory work environment. 26 Next this section
reviews the holdings of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, which appended an affirmative defense for
employers in concordance with the holding in Vinson.2 7 Finally, this
section will discuss the split among circuit courts as to the interpretation of
"opposition" and the guidelines presented by the EEOC.
A. Employer's Liability for Discriminatory Work Environment
Before Rogers v. EEOC, employers were liable only when an employee
suffered a tangible economic loss because of discrimination.28 Therefore, to
avoid liability, employers had an incentive only to prevent discrimination
from affecting an employee's monetary interest.29 In 1971, the Fifth
Circuit, in Rogers, interpreted Title VII to include protection for employees
from a discriminatory work environment. 30 The Rogers court relied upon
the Title VII provision stating, "it shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer... 'to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'' 31 In Rogers,
Jospehine Chavez, a Spanish woman, worked for S. J. and N. Jay Rogers,
optometrists, and alleged discriminatory employment practices by the
Rogers, who segregated his patients and allowed seven Caucasian workers
to "abuse" her.32 The District Court held that the fact that the employee
merely felt uncomfortable in her work environment did not qualify her as a
"person aggrieved" 33 under Title VII. 34  The Fifth Circuit reversed,
25. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute, Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109, as recognized in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466
U.S. 54 (1984); see also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65-66.
26. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 72.
27. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
28. Konrad S. Lee, "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again" Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35
PEPP. L. REV. 247, 260-61 (2008).
29. Id. at 261.
30. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
31. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)).
32. Id. at 236.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (defining an aggrieved person as one who is able to bring a claim for
unlawful employment practices).
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reasoning that the work environment can be "so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority group workers"35 and that such treatment would alter
the "terms [and] conditions" protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.36
But the court stated that a mere utterance of an epithet that may offend was
insufficient to violate the Act.37 By holding so, the Fifth Circuit expanded
Title VII to include harassment, or hostile work environment, as a form of
discrimination.38
It was not until 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that the United
States Supreme Court officially recognized that Title VII protected
employees from sexual harassment.3 9 In Vinson, a former bank employee
brought an action against the bank and her supervisor, alleging that during
her employment she had been subjected to sexual harassment by the
supervisor. 40 She asserted that the supervisor repeatedly made demands for
sexual favors, exposed himself, and even forcibly raped her on several
occasions. 41 She also testified that the supervisor fondled and touched other
women employees. 42 The Court noted that ever since the Rogers decision
many circuits had relied on its rationale to adopt harassment as a valid
claim under the Act to protect race, religion, and national origin and that
nothing in Title VII suggested that freedom from sexual harassment should
not also be protected. 43 Thus, the Court, following Rogers' lead, held that
"[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. "', 44
Vinson, however, is not only significant for recognizing sexual
harassment as actionable, but also for ruling that agency principles would
apply in determining whether or not an employer would be vicariously
34. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237.
35. Id. at 238.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Lee, supra note 28, at 260.
39. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
40. Id. at 60.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 66; see also Cariddi v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)
(recognizing national origin harassment); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549
F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (recognizing racial harassment); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545
F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (recognizing racial harassment); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp.
157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (recognizing religious harassment).
44. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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liable for the sexual harassment, thereby creating an incentive for
employers to regulate employees' conduct toward one another. 45 The
District of Columbia Circuit held that an employer was absolutely liable for
sexual harassment conducted by a supervisor regardless of whether the
employer knew or should have known about the misconduct.46 That
decision relied on Title VII's definition of "employer" which included "any
agent of such a person. '47 The Circuit Court theorized that a supervisor is
an agent of the employer, and though he may not have the authority to hire,
fire, or promote, "the mere existence... of a significant degree of influence
in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to impose on
employees. '48 At the Supreme Court level, the EEOC, as amicus curiae,
submitted a brief arguing that the Court should follow agency principles
and find that when a supervisor uses the authority delegated by the
employer to harass employees then the employer should be strictly liable.49
The EEOC further argued that when a sexual harassment claim based on
hostile environment is brought, agency principles dictate a rule that rests on
whether the employee had reasonable channels to complain of the
harassment and, if used, whether the employer reasonably interceded. 50 The
Supreme Court noted that the EEOC's arguments contradicted its own
guidelines. 51 For example, the EEOC held an employer liable for the acts of
its agents without regard to notice, but also requires an examination of the
circumstances to determine the particular relationship as a supervisor or
agent. 52
The Court, however, declined to issue a definitive rule as to employer
liability, but it did agree that Congress wanted courts to utilize agency
principles for direction.53 It opined that Congress defined "employer" to
include any "agent" of the employer, suggesting the intention to limit an
employer's liability regarding some acts by employees. 54 The Court also
stated that neither the existence of a grievance procedure nor the absence of
notice of the harassment by a supervisor would be cause for absolute
immunity for the employer while the opposite would not equal automatic
45. See id. at 73.
46. Id. at 63.
47. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 70-71.
50. Id. at 71.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985)).
53. Id. at 72.
54. Id.
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liability either.55 Thus, the Court reversed the Circuit Court's holding that
employers are absolutely liable for its supervisors' sexual harassment and
instead ruled that courts should use agency principles to aid in determining
an employer's liability.56
In the wake of Vinson, the courts were again left with little guidance as
to the extent of employer liability regarding sexual harassment, resulting in
different approaches among the courts.57 The disparity among the courts
naturally caused confusion for employers in developing preventive
schemes, and in response, the EEOC released a policy statement
encouraging employers to construct a complaint procedure "designed to
'encourage victims of harassment to come forward' [without requiring] a
victim to complain first to the offending supervisor. ' 58 The Supreme Court
in 1998 decided to construct a more uniform and predictable federal
standard to reconcile the circuits and the EEOC.59 The cases of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton both involved
the issue of vicarious liability for sexual harassment claims and were
decided by the Supreme Court on the same day.60 Since the reasoning and
holdings are similar, they will be discussed together.
In Ellerth, the plaintiff-employee quit her job after fifteen months as a
salesperson for her employer because she alleged to have repeatedly been
the victim of sexual harassment by one of her supervisors.61 Her supervisor
was a manager who had authority to hire and promote employees. 62 The
55. Id.
56. Id. at 72-73 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)).
57. Compare Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
employer could be liable for a supervisor's hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII
based on respondeat superior, actual knowledge, apparent authority, or delegated authority to control
plaintiff's work environment which aided in the harassment), and Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d
773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) ("We hold that an employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive work
environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to further the
harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency
relationship."), with Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[A]n employer may not be
held liable for a supervisor's hostile work environment harassment if the employer is able to establish
that it had adopted policies and implemented measures such that the victimized employee either knew or
should have known that the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to the
employer without fear of adverse consequences.").
58. EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment (Mar. 19, 1990),
http://archive.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (quoting Vinson, 477
U.S. at 73).
59. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998).
60. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775, 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742, 746-47.
61. Ellerth, 542 U.S. at 747-48.
62. Id. at 747.
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employee testified to multiple occasions of offensive remarks and gestures
made by her supervisor and to three specific instances where her supervisor
threatened to deny her tangible job benefits.63 She refused all of her
supervisor's advances without suffering tangible retaliation, and despite her
knowledge of her employer's policy against harassment, she never reported
the misconduct. 64
In Faragher, the employee, Beth Ann Faragher, worked for the city as a
lifeguard and alleged that her supervisors sexually harassed her.65 One
supervisor, Terry, allegedly touched her body without invitation, wrapped
his arms around her with his hand on her buttocks, insulted Faragher on her
shape, and made crude references to women. 66 During an interview with an
applicant, Terry said that female lifeguards had sex with the males and
asked if she would too.67 Faragher's other supervisor, Silverman, also
allegedly engaged in sexual harassment. 68 Silverman tackled Faragher and
stated that, if not for a certain physical characteristic of hers, he would have
sex with her.69 He pantomimed oral sex, made vulgar remarks to women,
commented on female lifeguards' bodies, and told them he would like to
have sex with them.70 Faragher failed to complain to higher management
about Terry or Silverman's actions.71
As previously stated, the goal of both opinions was to construct a
uniform standard that courts could use in order to create a consensus in the
circuits. 72 To do so, the Supreme Court turned to the concept of vicarious
liability, noting that some of the circuits had relied on various types of
agency principles and rationales to hold that whenever a supervisor was the
tortfeasor, the employer would automatically be vicariously liable based on
a proxy theory.73 The proxy theory rationalizes that when a supervisor
63. Id. at 747-48.
64. Id. at 748-49.
65. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780-81.
66. Id. at 782.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 785-86; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998).
73. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790-91; see, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 23 (1993)
(finding that president of corporate employer may be treated as the organization's proxy); Bums v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding employer liable where
harassment was committed by owner).
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conducts harassment using the authority delegated by his employer, his
conduct becomes that of the employer because the supervisor could not
have harassed without such delegation of power.7 4 Other circuits, however,
used the Restatement of Agency, cited in Vinson, to determine whether an
employer should be vicariously liable for sexual harassment.75  The
Restatement states that "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment. '76
Intentional torts are typically not considered to be within the scope of
employment since employers do not hire employees to commit torts. 77
The Court, when configuring the definitive rule that would be the
controlling precedent regarding employer liability, took a few factors into
account. First, the Court recognized that since Vinson, Congress had
enacted amendments through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, modifying
statutory grounds of other Supreme Court decisions while leaving Vinson
intact.78 Thus, the Court concluded that it was Congress's intention that
Vinson be ruling authority. 79 Second, the Court noted that the EEOC's
manuals and Title VII's enforcement demonstrated Congress's intent to
recognize employers' obligations to prevent harassment and give credit to
employers who made reasonable efforts to do so. 80 Finally, the Court noted
that Title VII also borrowed the avoidable consequences doctrine from tort
law.81 Keeping these goals in mind, the Court constructed a rule that
upheld Vinson's agency principles, implemented incentives for employers
to prevent sexual harassment, and required victims to mitigate harm.82
Therefore, the Court ruled, "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to
74. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The supervisor is
deemed to act on behalf of the employer when making decisions that affect the economic status of the
employee. From the perspective of the employee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single
entity."); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (lth Cir. 1989) ("When a
supervisor requires sexual favors as a quidpro quo for job benefits, the supervisor, by definition, acts as
the company.").
75. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
77. Id. § 219 cmt. e; see, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1997),
vacated by 524 U.S. 947 (1998) (stating that sexual harassment "simply is not within the job description
of any supervisor or any other worker in any reputable business"); Andrade v. Mayfair Mgmt., Inc., 88
F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[I]llegal sexual harassment is ... beyond the scope of supervisors'
employment.").
78. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 n.4.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 806.
81. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)).
82. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense... .' 83 The defense requires the
employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, two elements: "(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. '8 4
B. Interpretation of "Opposition" Within the Circuits
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination under
section 2000e-3(a), a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that plaintiff
engaged in protected activity, (2) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) that there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.85 Section 2000e-
3(a), the antiretaliation provision, specifically divides "protected activity"
into two separate categories: the opposition clause and the participation
clause.86 Though the participation clause protects fewer activities of an
employee than the opposition clause, it provides a stronger protection.87
The purpose of the participation clause is to protect all avenues to the
EEOC. 88 The participation clause grants an absolute privilege for filing a
claim with the EEOC, and there is no requirement that the discrimination
claim be meritorious, whereas the opposition clause only protects a
petitioner who has a reasonable belief that the alleged conduct is illegal. 89
Most courts have interpreted the participation clause to require that an
employee file a claim, while the opposition clause protects less formal
complaints.9"
In 1998, the EEOC issued a Compliance Manual to provide guidance as
to what it considered "opposition." 91 The manual stated that opposition
83. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
84. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
85. See, e.g., Lang v. Ill. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 361 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 2004); Xin Liu
v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2003).
86. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 952 F. Supp. 1129, 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997).
87. Croushorn v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Tenn., 518 F. Supp. 9, 21 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
88. Id. at22.
89. Id. at 21.
90. See, e.g., Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989).
91. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-1IB(1) (May 20, 1998).
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existed when an employee "communicates to his or her employer.., a belief
that its activity constitutes a form of employment discrimination that is
covered by any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC. '92 Despite this
guidance, courts have differed in interpreting the communication aspect of
opposition.93  Some courts have interpreted communication liberally,
whereas others have interpreted it more stringently. For example, in Bruno
v. RIH Acquisitions MS I, LLC, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi held that an employee's statement, "that's
not right," in response to his employer's refusal to hire an applicant because
he was too old, was protected activity.94 In Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc.,
however, Smith's employer made sexual advances toward her on multiple
occasions and would call her into his office presumably for work-related
matters but instead attempted to have sex with her.95 Despite her refusals
and emails requesting that he stop, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland held that Smith's communication fell short of the
standard for protected activity under the opposition clause. 96  Strictly
interpreting the EEOC manual, the court stated, "[t]o the extent that
Plaintiff communicated only that McLallen should cease his sexual
advances, Plaintiff failed to communicate that she was requesting this
because she believed his advances to be illegal. '97
Besides the communication aspect, courts are split as to what activities
are regarded as opposition. One interpretation requires a more active
approach to opposition that falls in line with Rachel-Smith.98 For example
in Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, two employees, Fetty and Bell,
began a romantic relationship together and lived with one another. 99 Bell
complained to co-workers about Safety's decision to hire male employees
to work overtime when Fetty could do the same work for less money, and
Fetty filed a gender discrimination charge against Safety with the EEOC.10 0
Bell's supervisor instructed him to tell Fetty to "back off," to which Bell
92. Id.
93. Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. App'x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004).
94. Bruno v. RIH Acquisitions MS I, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 819, 821 (N.D. Miss. 2008).
95. Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (D. Md. 2003).
96. Id. at 748.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g, Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3rd Cir. 1995) ("A general complaint of
unfair treatment does not translate into a charge of illegal age discrimination."); Pawlak v. Seven
Seventeen HB Phila. Corp. No. 2, No. Civ.A.99-CV-5390, 2005 WL 696878, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24,
2005) (stating that plaintiffs memorandum complained of the negative business ramifications as a result
of employer's activities and not specifically against the racial discrimination).
99. Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed. App'x 607, 608 (6th Cir. 2004).
100. Id.
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responded he would not, suggesting that the supervisor tell Fetty himself. 101
Bell alleged that the employer decreased his overtime and declined to rehire
him after a seasonal layoff because of his relationship with Fetty.1°2 The
Sixth Circuit held that despite his refusal to relay the message and despite
his complaints to other workers regarding the labor issue, opposition
demanded "active, consistent, 'opposing' activities to warrant [Title VII]
protection against retaliation. '10 3
In contrast to Bell, McDonnell v. Cisneros recognized "passive
opposition. ' 10 4 The employer in McDonnell ordered a supervisor to prevent
his subordinates from filing discrimination claims.105 The plaintiff did not
communicate opposition but rather failed to follow the order. ° 6 1 i
response, the employer reassigned the plaintiff because of his inability to
control his subordinates.10 7 The Seventh Circuit held that the failure to
follow a command constituted "passive opposition" and thus a protected
activity. 10 8 The court opined that to hold otherwise would allow employers
to obtain immunity from the retaliation statute by directing their
subordinates to prevent other workers from complaining about
discrimination.10 9
In the context of this discord between the courts, the Supreme Court
through Crawford sought to determine the standard by which the courts
should interpret section 2000e-3(a). In addition to defining the opposition
clause, the Crawford Court restrained itself from disrupting the incentive
scheme produced by Faragher and Ellerth.110 Therefore, the Court's
objective was to define "oppose" and avoid nullifying an employer's
101. Id.
102. Id. at 609.
103. Id. at 610 (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding
that sending numerous letters to employer objecting to discriminatory hiring practices constituted
opposition); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
that sending one letter contesting a single decision to employer's human resources department did not
constitute opposition)).
104. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Tidwell v. Am. Oil Co., 332 F.
Supp. 424, 433, 436 (D. Utah 1971) (holding that plaintiff was protected by statute for failing to modify
minority races' applicants test scores).
105. McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 258.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 262.
109. Id.
110. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2009).
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motivation to obtain an affirmative defense."l
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford is significant
because it was the first time the Supreme Court defined "oppose" in the
context of Title V1.112 More importantly, this case involved retaliation
against an employee who did not voluntarily report discrimination." 3 The
defendant argued for a strict interpretation of the Title VII provision and
asserted that an adverse decision would conflict with prior Supreme Court
precedent regarding the public policy of Title VII.114 In the Crawford
opinion, the Court first defined "oppose" and articulated types of actions
that would fall under the term.115 The Court then discussed the public
policy behind the definition given. 116
A. What is the Definition of "Oppose?"
The Supreme Court, when first determining the meaning of "oppose" as
used in the statute, looked to the dictionary.117 The Court found that
"oppose" means "'to resist or antagonize... ; to contend against; to confront;
resist; withstand.' 118 The Court concluded, however, that "'RESIST
frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE,"' 119 and that
"oppose" means "'to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.' ' 120 Once it
settled on a definition, the Court immediately concluded that the description
Crawford gave the investigator, on its face, was a negative report of
sexually abhorrent behavior toward Crawford by Hughes, and according to
Crawford, the statement antagonized her employer to dismiss her
mendaciously. 121 Under this conclusion, the Court further explained that
Crawford's depiction of Hughes' treatment would suffice "in the minds of
111. See id.
112. See id. at 850.
113. See id. at 849-50.
114. Id. at 851-52.
115. Id. at 850-51.
116. Id. at 851-52.
117. Id. at 850.
118. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1958)).
119. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1958)).
120. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1359 (2d ed. 1987)).
121. Id. at 850-51.
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reasonable jurors as 'resist[ant] or antagoni[stic]. '122
The defendant asserted that the EEOC's Compliance Manual repeatedly
used active verbs to describe opposition conduct, such as "'threatening' to
file a charge or complaint; 'complaining'; 'protest[ing]'; 'picketing';
'refusing' to obey an order; and 'requesting' reasonable
accommodation. '123 The defendant further argued that, as the Sixth Circuit
held, Crawford answering questions was not sufficient enough "to put an
employer on notice that an employee 'opposes' an unlawful employment
practice," 124 and that there was no indication whether Crawford actually
opposed Hughes' conduct because her defensive responses were also
inappropriate. 125
Contrarily, the Court explained that the EEOC guidelines stated,
"'[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the
employer has engaged in... a form of employment discrimination, that
communication... constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity.' '1 26
As for Crawford's reactions to Hughes' behavior, the Court dismissed the
argument because the Court was reviewing the District Court's grant of
Metro's motion for summary judgment, and thus, all the facts were taken in
the light most favorable to Crawford.1 27 In any case, Crawford did not
indicate that Hughes' actions were anything but repugnant to her.128
At this point the Court addressed Bell. The Court held that although the
Sixth Circuit adopted the standard of opposition that demands "'active,
consistent opposing activities to warrant... protection against retaliation, and
that an employee must instigate or initiate a complaint to be covered,"'
those requirements are merely examples of opposition and are not the
limits.1 29 The Court declared that "oppose" extends beyond active conduct
and incorporates when one would "naturally use the word to speak of
122. Id. at 851.
123. Brief for the Respondent at 38, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.,
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-IB(2) (May 20, 1998)).
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 1-2 (stating that Crawford responded to Hughes' comments and actions by saying "bite me"
and "flipping him a bird.").
126. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 9, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846
(2009)).
127. Id. at 851 & n.2.
128. Id. at 851.
129. Id. (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP., 107 Fed. App'x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond
disclosing it."'130 Specifically, the Court referred to the McDonnell holding
and found that opposition existed, albeit passive, when an employee failed
to follow a supervisor's order to fire an employee based on discriminatory
principles.131 The Court extended the McDonnell reasoning to conclude
that a person opposes conduct by answering someone else's inquiries just as
if the testifier instigated the discussion and that it is imbalanced to hold that
an employee is protected by reporting discrimination on her own accord
"but not [when she] reports the same discrimination in the same words
when her boss asks a question. 132 The Court then went on to discuss
whether adopting passive opposition was contrary to the incentive scheme
created by Ellerth and Faragher.
B. Does Liability for Passive Opposition Upset the Incentive Scheme?
The defendant argued that non-active opposition contradicted the
holdings in Faragher and Ellerth, which encourage preventive and
corrective measures on the part of employers. 133 If the standards for a
retaliation claim are lowered then it becomes an "easy charge" when an
employee is adversely affected by a preventive/corrective internal
investigation, and employers as a result will fail to inquire into
discrimination allegations. 134
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, stating that this
reasoning discounts the incentive for employers to investigate that stems
from Ellerth and Faragher. 135 Though there is not an affirmative defense
when a tangible employment action is taken, the Court explained that an
employer has a defense when no tangible employment action is taken if it
has "'exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct"' discriminatory
actions and the employee failed to take advantage of the employer's
preventative and corrective measures. 136  The Court then cited to the
130. Id. The Court exemplified its position by stating that many opposed slavery before emancipation
and currently oppose capital punishment without "writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting
the government." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 851-52.
134. Id. at 852.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
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plaintiffs brief, which referenced studies suggesting that, since Faragher
and Ellerth, many employers have adopted or strengthened procedures
regarding discriminatory conduct.13 7 The Court dismissed the defendant's
argument because it was unlikely that an employer might one day want to
dismiss an employee who might charge discrimination linked to an internal
investigation; such an unlikelihood would not attenuate the incentive
provided by the Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense.138
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that following the Sixth Circuit's ruling
would undermine the policy underlying Faragher and Ellerth as well as the
statute's "'primary objective of avoiding harm' to employees." 139  The
Court deduced that if the law allowed an employer to penalize an employee
for cooperating in an internal investigation without remedy, then employees
would remain silent regarding Title VII claims, especially given that fear of
retaliation is the dominating reason for employees not reporting
discrimination. 140 The Court explained that following the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning would create a "Catch-22:" canny employers could escape
liability entirely by commencing inquiries and dismissing cooperative
employees, while prudent employees who would remain silent would fail
the second element of an employer's Faragher and Ellerth affirmative
defense. 141
The defendant further argued that requiring an individual to take active
steps to oppose discrimination correlates with the "requirement that an
employee take advantage of workplace procedures to actively report alleged
discrimination" prescribed by the Court in Faragher and Ellerth.142 The
Court rebuffed this argument because an employee's mitigation requirement
applied solely to those who endured discrimination and had the opportunity
to rectify it by "'tak[ing] advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer,"' which is based on the principle
that victims in general have a duty to mitigate damages. 143 Furthermore, the
137. Id. (citing Brief for the Petitioner at 25 n.31, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009) ("A 2001 workplace survey of over 200 human resource
executives conducted by a national law firm found that 82% of the respondents provided sexual
harassment prevention training for their supervisors, a sharp increase from the 34% that provided this
type of training in 1985.").
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)).
140. Id. (citing Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 20 (2005)).
141. Id.
142. Brief for the Respondent at 27, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.,
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
143. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 853 n.3 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807).
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Court reasoned that extending the mitigation requirement would
consistently fail, because the employees facing retaliation for reporting
discrimination on the behalf of others would have suffered no harm until
retaliated against.144 The employee is not a victim until she suffers the
harm that she is required to mitigate, therefore requiring the employee to
claim retaliation before retaliation occurs. 145
C. Concurring Opinion
Two justices wrote separately in a concurring opinion, agreeing with the
majority that the opposition clause protects employees who testify about
unlawful conduct in an internal investigation but disagreeing with the
holding that the clause protects non-active opposition.146 The concurring
opinion relied, as did the majority, on the EEOC guideline which states that
an employee's communication of discrimination to an employer almost
always constitutes opposition to the conduct.1 47 The concurring justices
agreed that "oppose" can mean and is used to express hostility of opinion,
but that the primary definition of the term required "conduct that is active
and purposive. ' 148 Furthermore, the concurring justices noted that all of the
remaining conduct protected by the retaliation clause "requires active and
purposive conduct,"149 and the fact that "'several items in a list share an
attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that
attribute as well."' 150 Specifically, the justices feared that an interpretation
of the opposition clause that protected passive conduct could have negative
repercussions.1 51  For example, the justices gave the scenario that an
employee may allege that she expressed opposition to a co-worker at the
"proverbial water cooler" and was overheard by another. 152 The opinion
noted that some courts have held that an employee alleging retaliation can
prove causality merely from temporal proximity of the employer's
knowledge of the protected activity and the detrimental employment
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 853, 855 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that whether the opposition clause protects employees
who do not communicate their views with purposive conduct was not at issue in the case at hand).
147. Id. at 853.
148. Id. at 853-54.
149. Id. at 854; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (stating that a person must have "made charge,
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation").
150. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting S. D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.
Protection, 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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action. 153 Thus, an employee may assert a prima facie retaliation case based
solely on the fact that the employer was indirectly informed or cognizant of
the employee's position prior to any discipline. 15 4 Lastly, the concurring
justices pointed out that the number of retaliation claims filed with the
EEOC has escalated and that the commodious interpretation of protected
opposition activity will cause the number to further rise. 155  The
concurrence concluded that it would have been sufficient for the Court to
confine its holding to an employee who testified about unlawful conduct in
an internal investigation. 15 6
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Crawford Court reached the correct result, but
that it was unnecessary to interpret the opposition clause so broadly. First,
the Court could have upheld an "active opposition" interpretation and
reconciled Bell, McDonnell, and the EEOC Compliance Manual. Second,
the Court's interpretation is inconsistent with the remainder of Title VII.
Finally, the Court's holding runs counter to the employer incentives created
in Faragher and Ellerth. Though the Court correctly found that Crawford's
conduct was protected by the opposition clause, such an expansive holding
will cause unintended consequences.
A. Active Opposition
The Supreme Court erred in refusing to adopt "active opposition." The
Court's adopted definition of "opposition" is "to be hostile or adverse to, as
in opinion. ' 157 The Court also stated that it heavily relied on McDonnell's
"passive opposition" and the EEOC's Compliance Manual, stating that
almost any communication from an employee regarding harassment will
constitute opposition.1 58 The Court, however, misinterpreted the EEOC's
Compliance Manual. The holding by the Rachel-Smith court is more
accurate, since the EEOC guideline specifically states that the
153. Id. at 854-55 (citing Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001); Gorman-
Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady County, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001); Conner v.
Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir. 1997); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d
1446, 1458 (7th Cir. 1994)).
154. Id. at 855.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 850 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 851.
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communication must be because the employee believed that the employer's
behavior was illegal in order to constitute opposition.159 To hold that
almost all communication regarding harassment is opposition is inaccurate.
Furthermore, the concurring opinion was correct by taking an active
opposition stance. The concurrence noted that all of the examples of
opposition in the manual were active, and "[t]hat several items in a list
share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as
possessing that attribute as well. ' 160 Thus, the Court should have adopted
an active opposition interpretation.
Moreover, the Court could still have held that failing to act is protected
as active opposition, thus reconciling McDonnell and Bell. An employee
who fails to follow a discriminating directive from a superior, as in
McDonnell, actively opposes the employer. 161  Failure to act is an
affirmative, conscious decision on the part of the employee and implicitly
communicates opposition to the employer when he discovers that his orders
were not followed. Inaction is purposive and creates tangible
consequences, whereas the "hostility in opinion" definition does not
manifest any results that would indirectly communicate opposition to an
employer. Therefore, an employee who refuses to follow a discriminatory
order indirectly, but purposively, communicates his opposition to his
employer, thus reconciling McDonnell, Bell, and the EEOC Compliance
Manual. As for Crawford's communication, the defendant argued that her
testimony never specifically stated that she opposed Hughes' behavior, thus
she was not communicating the conduct because she believed it was illegal,
as required by the EEOC manual. 162 This argument, however, fails even
under this Note's strict interpretation. Crawford knew that the internal
investigation was for sexual harassment complaints and that the testimony
she gave would likely have adverse effects on Hughes. 163 Therefore,
because she knew that her testimony reported illegal conduct, her
communication opposed the conduct. Thus, the Court could have upheld a
strict interpretation of the opposition clause and still have reconciled the
circuits along with the EEOC's manual.
159. Rachel-Smith v. FTData, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 734, 748 (D. Md. 2003).
160. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting S. D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl.
Protection, 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006)).
161. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1996).
162. See note 125 and accompanying text.
163. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849 (majority opinion).
2010]
310 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIII:xiii
B. Title VII: Uniform Standard
In Crawford, the Supreme Court should have applied racial harassment
standards to sexual harassment claims. The Court noted in Faragher that
the circuit courts have often drawn on cases involving racial harassment
standards to develop sexual harassment standards, thereby creating a
uniform standard in harassment cases. 164 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
the Supreme Court, relying on racial harassment standards, held that a
hostile work environment for sexual harassment must be both objectively
and subjectively offensive-one that a reasonable person would find hostile
and one that the victim perceived to be hostile. 165 In Ellerth, the dissent
opined that the Court, when creating the incentive scheme to prevent sexual
harassment, should have adopted racial harassment standards. 166 The same
holds true in Crawford. The Rogers court held that a mere utterance of a
racial epithet would not rise to the level of racial harassment to create a
hostile work environment. 167 This standard has been true regarding sexual
harassment. 168 Thus, in opposition cases, a mere utterance of disapproval
should not rise to the level of opposition required for protection. 169 The
Court, as it did in Harris, should adopt an objective and subjective standard
for opposition, so that a reasonable person must find the employee's
conduct to be opposition, and the employee must have intended to oppose
the employer's actions. 170 The Crawford Court hinted at an objective
standard when it stated that "Crawford's description of the louche goings-
on would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as 'resist[ant]'
or 'antagoni[stic]' to Hughes's treatment." 171  Moreover, by having an
objective standard, courts would be able to weed out more claims through
summary judgment. If opposing behavior were held to an objective
standard, then the employee's actions would need to rise to a level that a
reasonable employer would find to be opposition. If the behavior would not
reasonably be seen as opposition, then a plaintiff would not be able to prove
cause, thus more cases could be eliminated in summary judgment stages.
164. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 & n.1 (1998).
165. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19, 21-22 (1993).
166. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 774 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute, Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109, as recognized in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466
U.S. 54 (1984).
168. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786-87.
169. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
170. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
171. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 851 (2009).
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The Crawford Court mentioned in dicta that many people opposed slavery
before emancipation. 172 In that sense, one may interpret that the Court
meant that people's opinions against slavery constituted opposition. Under
the Crawford holding, cases involving mental opposition against slavery
would survive summary judgment but would fail to prove cause. Thus, in
using an objective standard of opposition, frivolous cases would more
readily be dismissed.
Finally, there is the defendant's argument that such a liberal
interpretation of opposition would render the participation clause
superfluous: "[u]nder Ms. Crawford's paradigm, there would be no need for
the participation clause because 'opposition' would be defined so broadly
as to include the most casual conversation between a potential plaintiff and
another." 173 Although the Supreme Court never addressed this argument,
this Note argues it is valid. The purpose of the participation clause was to
provide absolute protection for employees who file with the EEOC whereas
the opposition clause was to provide less. 174 Thus, if the opposition clause
allows employees to be protected for virtually any conduct, the participation
in an EEOC's investigation would certainly be considered opposition to any
employer's conduct. Therefore, the defendant was correct in asserting that
with the Court's decision, the participation clause has become irrelevant.
C. Employer's Incentives
The Crawford decision will likely cause the number of retaliation claims
to rise because it provides employers a negative incentive to investigate
sexual harassment claims. Title VII's primary role is to encourage
forethought by employers to prevent harm and allow employees to correct
harm without filing charges. 175 Crawford's concurring opinion notes that
the number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC doubled between
1992 and 2007 and that the broad interpretation of protected opposition will
cause the claims to proliferate. 176  Furthermore, the concurrence's
proverbial water cooler example exhibits how a mere comment describing
172. Id.
173. Brief for the Respondent at 25, Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.,
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
174. Blizzard v. Newport News Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 670 F. Supp. 1337, 1344 (E.D. Va.
1984).
175. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
176. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 855 (Alito, J., concurring).
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disagreement to a co-worker could turn into a retaliation claim for
employers because the causal element can be proven with temporal
proximity.177
Ultimately, Crawford will affect how employers conduct internal
investigations. The Court erred by quickly dismissing the defendant's
argument that the interpretation will undercut the Faragher and Ellerth
decisions, believing that the affirmative defense available for employers
was sufficient.178 One commentator noted that the Supreme Court failed to
address another issue: Does every response to an employer's internal
investigation of sexual harassment constitute opposition?179 The plaintiff in
Crawford gave a detailed testimony of the alleged sexually harassing
behavior, so the Court did not need to delve into the question. 180 But where
an employee's response is vague or ambiguous, there is no guidance as to
whether an employer is required to investigate further.1 81 If the employer
does not, it could be precluded from using the Faragher and Ellerth
affirmative defense. 18 2 Contrarily, at what point is the employee protected
by Crawford?183
Despite the overly broad decision in Crawford, some courts have
declined to utilize Crawford in such a manner. In Pitrolo v. County of
Buncombe, N.C., the Fourth Circuit held that Crawford did not apply when
an employee complained to her father because the EEOC manual requires
communication to the employer. 84 Thus, the court decided not to give
deference to Crawford's definition of opposition.18 5 Likewise, in Edwards
v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama LLC, where an employee
answered a nurse's questions regarding sexual harassment and subsequently
was not rehired after medical leave, the District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama declined to apply Crawford's extension because there
was no evidence that the nurse forwarded the complaints to a supervisor or
177. Id. at 854.
178. Id. at 852 (majority opinion).
179. Paul I. Weiner, A Brief Treatise on Punitive Damages Under Title VII and Will the Supreme
Court's Recent Holding in Crawford End Up Derailing the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense in
Sexual Harassment Cases?, 799 PLI/ Lit 125, 136 (2009).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Pitrolo v. County of Buncombe, N.C., No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3 & n.6 (4th Cir. Mar.
11,2009).
185. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 850 (2009).
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anyone else in the chain of command. 18 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court correctly held that Title VII's antiretaliation
provision protected Crawford from her employer's dismissal. The Court,
however, took unnecessary steps and made unnecessary determinations to
protect Crawford and created a disconcerting, overly broad interpretation of
the opposition clause. The full effects of the Crawford decision have yet to
manifest, but it is likely that the number of EEOC claims will increase and
employer liability will accelerate as well.
186. Edwards v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, No. 2:07cv908-MHT, 2009 WL 1257164, at *2 (M.D.
Ala., May 5, 2009).
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